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The ambivalent relation between 
state and illegal actors: piracy retail 
in Mexico
José Carlos G. Aguiar
In the rise of democratic governments across Latin America, the neoliberal 
law-and-order perspective has been the most influential model of security in 
the region. This approach is based on the opposition between state and illegal 
agents, as if they were two different sets of actors. Influenced by this model, 
Mexican president Vicente Fox launched an extensive anti-piracy programme to 
eradicate retail of counterfeit. Based on ethnographic material gathered in the 
San Juan de Dios market in Guadalajara, I discuss on the exchanges between 
piracy sellers and police officers. My argument is that law enforcement pro-
grammes have not affected the political economy of corruption, they overlook 
the net of ambiguous loyalties where state and illegal actors are entrenched. 
The anthropology of the state provides the rationale for a critique on neoliberal 
security policies.
KEYWORDS: piracy, illegality, police, Mexico.
THE RELATION BETWEEN STATE AND PRIVATE ACTORS IN THE 
organisation of illegal activities has been documented in the ethnography of 
smuggling, drug trafficking, corruption and the political economy of gifts in 
Africa, Asia, Latin America and, to a much lesser extent, in Eastern and Western 
Europe. In the anthropology of the state and illegality there are two analytical 
standpoints that come to the fore. First of all, the involvement of state actors 
in unlawful activities is explained as a shortcoming of the state, that is, state 
malfunction causes corruption. In sub-Saharan Africa, the works by Nugent 
and Asiwaju (1996), Chabal and Daloz (1999), and Bayart, Ellis and Hibou 
(1999) present evidence on the multiple accommodations between smugglers 
and officers, giving room to an exchange of favours and values. State corrup-
tion is not an exception, but “a habitual part of everyday life, an expected 
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element of every social transaction” (Chabal and Daloz 1999: 99). States in 
West Africa that result from the experience of European (de)colonisation are 
intrinsically ambivalent, since they represent and endorse the rule of law, but 
also participate and benefit from the activities they should proscribe.
“[T]he state is simultaneously illusory and substantial. It is illusory 
because its modus operandi is essentially informal, the rule of law is feebly 
enforced and the ability to implement public policy remains most limited. 
It is substantial because its control is the ultimate prize for all political elites 
[…] The state is thus both strong and powerless, overdeveloped in size and 
underdeveloped in functional terms” (Chabal and Daloz 1999: 9).
In this context, the state integrates both the formal and illegal domains. 
Hibou (1999) argues that these national states are not weak, since they are 
materialised and present in regulations and paperwork; they are neither shadow, 
because there is no workable distinction between the state apparatus and ille-
gality. State officials ease up, for instance, the work of smugglers with “dirty 
tricks”, the falsification of documents to avoid customs duties (Hibou 1999: 
102-113). Hence, Hibou choses the term “alter ego” to catch the ambiguous 
way the state simultaneously enforces the law and organises illegal activities in 
Zimbabwe, Uganda and Nigeria:
“[T]he state participates actively in the informal economy, especially 
in matters affecting international trade […] It is a characteristic of every 
sphere in which the state intervenes in Africa, as much in economic rela-
tions of exchange and production as in political and social relations” (Hibou 
1999: 89).
In a similar analysis, Van Schendel (2005) illustrates in his work on the 
Bengal borderland the limits of the state in the definition and control of com-
modity flows at the national borders. State officers in South Asia are key 
actors in the regulation of smuggling. The cases in Asia and Africa represent 
early stages within the larger cycle of state formation: countries with disputed 
or unclear frontiers, vulnerable officers in need of professionalisation. A con-
solidated nation-state would effectively enforce the rule of law and surveil its 
national borders (Cunningham and Heyman 2004). Up to this point, there 
is a normative perspective in the analysis of the relation between state and 
illegality.
“It is therefore assumed that a more pervasive public exercise of social 
discipline through state institutions will work to prevent corruption by sti-
fling the selfish greed of individuals” (Hasty 2005: 271).
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From a second analytical standpoint, arrangements between state and ille-
gal actors render stable systems of corruption. The literature points at the 
“solid” nature of the political economy of corruption. State and illegal actors 
are integrated through systematic corruption, bribery, and exchange of gifts. 
The relation between state and illegal actors renders parallel forms of taxing 
and state expansion (Cross 1998; Lomnitz-Adler 2000).
In the 21st century, with neoliberalism as the dominant ideology, there is 
a renewed attention upon the normative perspective on corruption. Projects 
are introduced to “modernise” national states and bring them to the “law-and-
order” principles promulgated by corporate power. State reform or adjustment 
are euphemisms of state domestication. Neoliberal policies are “transferred” 
from one region of the world to the other, homogenising security programmes 
in countries and cities (Rose 1991; Evans and Davies 1999). Anti-corruption 
and security programmes are relevant examples of this, which have been pro-
moted across Latin America.
Through the 20th century, the permanence in power of political elites or 
parties was the main objective of the security agenda for Latin American gov-
ernments. This is the national security model, that was focused on the control 
of dissidence and opposition to (semi)dictatorial regimes. In the context of 
democratisation, there is in the region since the 1980s a transition from the 
national security to a citizen security scheme (Dammert 2007). Security poli-
cies aim at guaranteeing the security of the citizenry. They are influenced by a 
law-and-order perspective, with the US government as promoter in the interna-
tional playground (Bailey and Dammert 2006; Tulchin and  Ruthenburg 2006). 
This model is based on legal enforcement through reactive plans of action that 
target illegal and criminal economies or actors; it privileges the use of public 
force over more comprehensive or proactive policies. Even more, this model is 
anchored on the opposition between state and illegality, assuming that illegal 
actors essentially are anti-state actors (Aguiar and Suárez de Garay 2008).
Under the influence of the law-and-order model, a number of national 
governments in Latin America make use of a belligerent discourse to launch 
“wars” against social problems. Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, and Mexico have 
declared wars on informal commerce, urban delinquency, drugs, smuggling or 
terrorism (Cross 1998; Cano and Santos 2001; Diamint 2004). Far-embracing 
programmes, often financed by the US government, promote zero tolerance, 
revanchism, populist punitiveness and the criminalisation of poverty. These 
programmes shape national and local security agendas, leading to some kind 
of “franchising” of security policies across the region.
Based on this perspective, the Mexican president Vicente Fox (2000-2006) 
embarked in the “war on piracy”. This programme placed the reduction of 
piracy retail as a priority in the security agenda and directed police action 
against marketplaces and street vending across the country, reaching more than 
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six thousand seizures in 2006 (Aguiar 2010). Never before so much attention 
and resources were devoted to the protection of intellectual property rights.
In this article I present ethnographic material collected between 2003 and 
2010 in the San Juan de Dios market in the city of Guadalajara, Mexico, to 
discuss on state and illegal actors, and the uncertainty and risk constitutive to 
their relations.1 Given its pivotal function in the production and trade of boot-
leg, this marketplace has become a main target in the anti-piracy programme 
launched by president Fox.
STATE AND ILLEGALITY: A POROUS FRONTIER
Corruption worked in Mexico as an agglutinating factor in the formation of 
the one-party system that governed for the most part of the 20th century. The 
political culture nurtured by the Partido de la Revolución Institucional (PRI) is 
ambiguously defined by cultural nationalism and corruption. By making refer-
ence to surveys on Mexican public opinion carried out during the 1950s, Morris 
points to the fact that the “extraordinarily low levels of trust in relation to the 
political system, the police and politicians” (Morris 2000: 223-224) are a typi-
cal feature in the historical evolution and integration of the PRI state in Mexico. 
This may seem a contradiction, since belief in legality is one of the most com-
mon sources of legitimacy. According to Weber, belief in and respect for the 
law are a powerful resource for the construction and maintenance of political 
orders (Weber 1978). The validity of a legitimate order lies at the core of a 
state’s functioning; it is its ultimate source of power and justification. However, 
if the authority systematically fails to protect the legal order, or if the authority 
tolerates and promotes the suspension of law, then the authority will lose its 
justification and legitimacy (Heidenheimer 1970). Yet, corruption has been a 
resource that political groups have utilised in order to form and impose political 
regimes, as observed in early state development in Europe (Blok 2001).
In the context of modern societies governed by national states, in the schol-
arly literature it is widely assumed that corruption undermines the very source 
of political authority, necessary for the establishment and maintenance of a 
political order. Corruption, the “use of a public faculty for obtaining particular 
benefits, generally by transgressing the rule of law” (Lomnitz-Adler 2000: 12) 
can erode the validity of the political system. Following Heidenheimer and 
Johnston (2005), corruption can work in three spheres: as offence by a public 
servant (juridical domain), as an economic measure taken by a public servant 
(market domain), and in the subversion of the public interest because of a 
personal interest (political domain). These three domains are not mutually 
exclusive, given that, for instance, a personal benefit (political domain) might 
1 All informants quoted have received nicknames.
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take place as a result of the suspension of the rule of law (juridical domain). 
Corruption has thus an instrumental character: the suspension of the rule of 
law in the pursuit of an interest.
“Illegal practices are not the monopoly of criminal elements, but rather 
various kinds of illegality, such as black markets, bribery and undocumented 
capital flows, are options taken up by identifiable classes, regional groups, 
ethnic groups, etc. at distinctive times. [G]roups involved in crimes are not 
isolates but act always in the field of relations – class relations, relations to 
the state, relations to natural resources, etc.” (Heyman 1999: 13).
Although corruption was an integrating factor of the PRI regime, there is 
little research in Mexico based on ethnographic material for the study of cor-
ruption. This is perhaps in part due to the difficulties inherent to this kind of 
fieldwork. The mechanisms and agencies that emerge between state and illegal 
actors are highly elusive.
In Los Policías: Una Averiguación Antropológica, Suárez de Garay describes the 
processes of identification inside the municipal police of Guadalajara, and the 
relations police officers establish with “the other”, that is, the social actors 
with whom officers come in contact on the street (Suárez de Garay 2006). 
The core argument Suárez de Garay poses is that the police are in fact ruled by 
otro orden (another set of values), a world different from the one the institution 
should enforce.
“The networks and habits of corruption are amongst the main problems 
of the police institution. Any officer who becomes part of it knows about the 
metamorphosis everybody undergoes when becoming part of the real world 
of the police, so far away from the values that the academy tries to convey” 
(Suárez de Garay 2006: 269; my translation).
Policing practices and the relation between police and society are medi-
ated by corruption and mistrust, and they do not correspond to the institu-
tions’ officially-stated purpose. Fraud and bribery become daily practices, and 
give shape to the perceptions and expectations of police officers; corruption 
becomes part of the social fabric, developing a particular police culture, a Welt-
anschauung at the heart of the institution. The relation between the police and 
illegal actors is ambiguous, often contradictory. The police frequently become 
part of the problem they are fighting against (Martínez de Murguía 1999), 
since criminal networks can also integrate officers, who benefit from selling 
their complicity with illegal actors. These perspectives point out to the porous 
frontier between state and illegal actors, and the difficulties in distinguishing 
the state from the actors it should prosecute.
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Corruption seems to show an apparent contradiction: the state attempts 
to reduce the illegality it actually promotes. In the scholarly literature, it is 
assumed that corruption deters the system of law (Bayart 1999; Haller and 
Shore 2005). Yet, by participating in both the formal and illegal domains, the 
state gains control over these two overlapping orders and benefits from them. 
Up to here, corruption works as a resource for power constitution, through 
which the state wins access to and orders the illegal world.
PIRATERÍA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION
The city of Guadalajara was founded in 1542 by Spanish colonisers and is 
the second largest city of Mexico, with more than 4 million inhabitants in the 
metropolitan area (INEG 2005). Trade, services and electronics industry are 
the main economic activities. Although the city doubled its population in ten 
years (1995-2005), it has preserved its “traditional” identity, with a charac-
teristic historical centre. Next to the Plaza Tapatia, the centre’s main square, 
stands the San Juan de Dios market, founded in the 16th century.
The marketplace still is a pivotal trading point in the city. About three thou-
sand sellers work in the 1600 stands the market has, and although there are 
no official records on the amount of visitors, the administration of the market 
estimates up to thirty thousand people a day in a busy weekend. The colourful 
and festive environment in the market that locals name “tradition” and “iden-
tity” is ambivalent, since this commercial space houses a number of illegal 
activities (prostitution, drug trafficking, contraband retail). More importantly, 
the market has become a target of the anti-piracy programme set up by the fed-
eral government. Once every month or two, the federal police raid the market 
to confiscate bootlegged merchandise.
In a Thursday morning, it seems a seizure has just taken place. There is 
something unusual. Many stalls are still closed. There is a sort of stress in the 
air. Retailers walk fast, almost running, carrying sizeable cardboard boxes and 
black garbage bags from one place to another. Oddly enough, there are piles of 
boxes standing in the corridors, as if they have been left behind or somebody is 
going to pick them up. The usual noise and hubbub is substituted by a laconic, 
heavy atmosphere: the red metal shutters of the stalls shut down and secured 
with heavy locks. There are barely any shoppers. The only noise is the steps of 
the retailers transporting merchandise. They move silently, lightly but quickly, 
as if they do not want to be noticed. There is not only stress, but also fear. 
A sellers says: “They [the police] were already here in the early morning”.
Piracy retailers are expecting the federal police to come back at any moment, 
and they are getting ready. There is little time to hide the merchandise. Just as 
in a fire drill, retailers act so quickly and resolutely that it becomes clear they 
have done this many times before. Yet, once again: to pack, as fast as possible, 
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discs in boxes (the new releases, the good copies, the most sold ones); close 
and tape the boxes, and then hide them in the stall of a relative or a friend who 
does not sell bootleg, or in the warehouse of the patrón where the merchandise 
can be kept safe. The federal, as they call the federal police, would normally 
only come to raid the stalls on their list, where there is official proof piracy is 
sold. Hiding pirate DVDs in a vegetable stall is therefore safe. Once the mer-
chandise is hidden and the stall closed, there is not much else to do. Then it is, 
for the retailers, time to wait until the raid is over.
Two young men in their mid-twenties carry big black garbage bags through 
the long and narrow corridors of the market. All of a sudden, they stop and 
unlock one stall, fold the metal shutter up and deposit their bags inside. There 
are CDs and DVDs in the bags they are hiding. They have heard about the 
police to come.
“Yes, and they are all dressed up [the police officers, as civilians], and that 
is why they have not opened yet [the most of piracy sellers in the market]. 
We have to store them here [the discs], because they come to check the stall, 
maybe not right now, but anyhow, everybody is stowing the merchandise”.
A bit further along, a few piracy stalls are open: the DVDs are on full dis-
play and the retailers are not packing, or putting discs in bags. Quite to the 
contrary, they seem very relaxed and chatty. Why do they behave so laid back 
if the police are about to come? “Them, always. They have more palancas” (lit-
erally, handles: to have contacts), tells Doña Luz, a seller of counterfeit jeans 
and shirts. Having the right contacts ensures access to reliable information and 
arrangements.
DOÑA LUZ – The raid was to be last night. And they [retailers] took every-
thing away. They were warned before, so, I do not know if they already have 
the green light [authorisation] to work again.
AGUIAR – So the raid was [emphasis] last night?
DOÑA LUZ – I have not heard anybody, anything. Maybe it was a false 
alarm; maybe later today... They are like, “we open, we do not”, “we do, we 
do not” and so. The most fearless have already opened again [...] since last 
night, they were taking everything out. How awful, just to see those ugly 
men, armed, it feels so awful. They do impress, and scare you; just imagine 
they tell you: “Hey, take everything out and come with me to tell...”
That day the police did not come to seize the marketplace. The raid did not 
take place during the night before nor the day after either. In the end, it was, 
as Doña Luz put it, a false alarm.
116  JOSÉ CARLOS G. AGUIAR etnográfica  fevereiro de 2011  15 (1): 109-128
Mordida
To give a bite (dar una mordida) or get bitten (ser mordido) are typical expres-
sions of the political culture in contemporary Mexico. They are political since 
they illustrate a distinctive sort of interaction between citizens and their 
 authorities.
The payment of a mordida can be indicative of the normalisation of cor-
ruption: a mordida is an occasional, circumstantial bribe, and it can be paid 
either voluntarily (bribing as a resource for avoiding the rule of law) or forcibly 
demanded (an officer, from his empowered position, asking for a bribe). Civil-
ians in Mexico are confronted by situations in which they feel that bribery is 
the only possible way out. Car drivers who cross red lights, and prefer to avoid 
the procedure involved in paying a fine, offer a mordida to the police agent who 
stopped them. As do businessmen and citizens to ease up paperwork. In the 
context of the PRI state, the mordida became regular, normalised corruption to 
handle governmental procedures, or a way to bypass the rule of law.
“[In the state created by the PRI regime] bureaucracy not only penetra-
tes practically every activity of social life (where almost everything requires 
some paperwork or bureaucratic procedure), yet the citizen has limitated 
institutional means to prevent the bureaucrat from abusing of his authority. 
Overall, the structure of the particular situation exposes the citizen to the 
conceited wishes of the bureaucrat, which in the end makes quite rational 
that the citizen accedes to pay the ‘mordida’ ” (Morris 2000: 226-227).
Corruption practices are widely accepted in the San Juan de Dios mar-
ket. Since popular markets and street vending are a socioeconomic space that 
has been historically framed in the realm of informality, mordidas are the very 
resource used by vendors to win some power and avoid municipal regulations. 
Bribing authorities has made possible the rise of commercial activities in places 
or zones in the cities where vending is not allowed (i. e. downtown pedestrian 
streets), or to tolerate the retail of merchandise that is not legal (Cross 1998; 
De la Peña 2000). Piracy retail in the San Juan de Dios market occurs within 
this framework: norms and regulations are neutralised by bribery.
Market retailers are accustomed to the mordida. PRI-related leaders used 
their authority to collect financial resources through the payment of mordidas. 
In order to be granted a license to retail, a stall or a permit, the vendor was 
expected to pay, on top of the costs of the paperwork, a mordida that ended up 
as a gratification in the pockets of municipal officers. Many market tenants 
find that this structure offered an “easy” or more “comfortable” way of solving 
practical affairs, since they paid the mordida and forgot about the matter. 
On the other hand, the retailers of illegal merchandise assume that mordidas 
were simply the price they had to pay for the illegal nature of their activity.
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While the Partido de Acción Nacional (PAN) government in Guadalajara2 
had overtly and repeatedly manifested its compromise with transparency and 
honesty, in the San Juan de Dios market this desire for a less corrupt admin-
istration is countered by the persistence of the mordida. Even today, mordidas 
continue to be a useful and no less successful mechanism, which piracy retail-
ers resource on. Given that the PRI-related leaders have more or less been put 
out of commission, bribes now follow a different circuit. Indeed, bribes are still 
paid to two kinds of actors: municipal officers and police agents. Municipal 
supervisors often argue it is either not their remit or primary task to prevent 
the sale of pirated material. This is despite that fact that the municipal regula-
tions for markets and tiangüis (street markets) clearly stipulate that all mer-
chandise should be of a legal nature. Yet, occasionally supervisors will control 
market vendors or peddlers around the market; the retailer knows that it is 
not the supervisor’s aim to seize the merchandise or close down the stall, but 
instead to receive a mordida, which he can demand because the retailer is not 
observing the law.
In and around the San Juan de Dios market, bribes are often paid to 
 municipal supervisors during the Christmas Season. Since peddling is not 
allowed in municipal markets, peddlers pay between 100 and 200 Mexican 
pesos (USD 9 to 18) a day to supervisors to let them to continue retailing, or 
they may even come to a “seasonal agreement” paying up to 12,000 pesos 
(USD 1090) for the four weeks prior to Christmas Eve.
The municipal government acknowledges that the mordida is still a common 
practice, that bootleg retailers bribe officers and that supervisors are often 
involved. In interviews with the Secretary of Government of the City of Gua-
dalajara, and the Director of Markets of the City of Guadalajara, both top 
officials explained this as the result of long-lasting practices of the political 
system inherited from past administrations – i. e. the PRI regime in which cor-
ruption had become normalised. In this way, retailers “automatically” react by 
paying a bribe, since they were used to doing so. With this line of thinking, 
the PAN authorities minimise corruption as an inheritance from the past, a 
cultural fact.
Given that copyrights are protected under the Federal Penal Code, the fed-
eral police is the institution that seizes pirated merchandise. Nonetheless, a 
mordida may still prevent the police from confiscating illegal goods. However, 
it is not always certain that police officers will accept a mordida. Since the mor-
dida corresponds to a circumstantial bribe, where the two parties negotiate and 
agree on the amount to pay, it is not sure whether the police will accept the 
bribe, or that the seller will stay calm enough to negotiate the mordida success-
fully, since a chance exists that in the end the merchandise will be confiscated. 
2 In power in the city government from 1994 to 2009.
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There is no fixed amount of money for a mordida; the seller and the police set 
it after negotiation (actual bargaining) and in relation to the severity of the 
infraction. When an important amount of merchandise is at stake, the bribe 
can thus be higher.
Vendors in the San Juan de Dios market, however, argue that raids aim at 
“showing off” a powerful hand of the police against piracy. After meeting the 
mordida, sellers who were previously detained are back in the market, with 
their stalls open and retailing exactly the same merchandise. It is also known 
that piracy vendors go to the police warehouses and bribe officers in order to 
retrieve their confiscated merchandise, as Héctor Contreras, a local journalist, 
explains:
“When [the police] carry out seizures, it is just pure show. The vendors 
later go to buy their merchandise directly from the police offices, ‘Hey, we 
want our merchandise back’. They pay a certain amount of money and it is 
handed back”.
Madrina
In the networks of retail and supply territorialised in the San Juan de Dios 
market, the madrina (godmother) has a critical function. In order to mini-
mise the risk of a police raid, which may result in the confiscation of material 
or detention, vendors make use of the various services their supplier offers. 
A CD supplier becomes an “entrepreneur” when he broads the array of ser-
vices to retailers. He provides not just merchandise to the sellers, but also 
 informal credits, bookkeeping and security. The entrepreneur is a smuggler of 
CDs inserted into international networks, who owns copying facilities (labora-
torios) where CDs and DVDs are reproduced, and wholesales the material among 
vendors in the marketplace.
Merchandise is often given to sellers on consignment, a service that deep-
ens the relationship between entrepreneurs and vendors. Entrepreneurs also 
have contacts in the police, through contact with a madrina. The madrina is a 
broker who mediates between the police and the sellers, he trades security and 
police information and communicates between the world of the police and the 
world of illegal actors.
“[P]olice forces had scores of secret agents who were known as ‘madri-
nas’, or godmothers, who were kept off the books but whose responsibili-
ties went far beyond those of informers. They were often allowed to carry 
guns and were used by federal and state police chiefs to do the dirty works 
that couldn’t be done by those on the government’s payroll – from stealing 
cars across the border to killing opposition activists. [T]he fact that the 
madrinas were not kept on a regular payroll gave them a virtual license to 
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 commit crimes and fostered additional corruption within the regular forces” 
( Oppenheimer 1996: 303).
The brokerage and intermediation functions of the madrina are comparable 
to those of the cacique (strongman) studied in the scholarly debate around state 
formation in 20th century Mexico (Bartra and Huerta 1975; De la Peña and 
Escobar Latapí 1986; Knight 1986; Pansters 1997; Knight and Pansters 2005). 
The role of caciques and madrinas demonstrates that in the corporatist context 
of the one-party system, the PRI, as a national party, integrated and developed 
parallel structures that ultimately nurtured a regime of exception. As a result, 
relations between the sate and citizens are mediated by informal actors.
The madrinas in the San Juan de Dios market have a number of contacts 
with the police, and connect informal and formal networks. In some cases, 
the madrina is a former police officer who was sacked and no longer works for 
the institution.3 He can sell his services as a provider of police information to 
illegal actors or perform dirty work.
“To minimize the impact of distorting elements in the corruption system, 
the police make use of informal networks to exercise more control on the 
recruitment of new agents and ‘madrinas’ […] Here, kinship or compadrazgo 
(godfathership), along the solidarity networks created amongst corrupt poli-
cemen, are helpful” (Resa 2001: 25-26).
In the San Juan de Dios market Eduardo Saldaña is a well known madrina 
among sellers of bootlegged CDs and DVDs. People in the market might say 
that Eduardo studied accounting in the public University of Guadalajara, but 
in more intimate conversation, they will admit he is a former police officer. 
To the world, Eduardo takes care of retailers’ paperwork; to the retailers, he 
provides security and information on upcoming police seizures. Eduardo skil-
fully displays his professional side as an accountant, and would never use the 
term madrina to describe himself. Eduardo owns a company offering financial 
advice, Asesoría El Mañana, and has an office in the lower middle-class north 
side of the city. His clients are sellers of pirated CDs, contraband and counter-
feit, who pay him an honorarium for his services. By providing this accounting 
service, Eduardo has access to information on the earnings of sellers at the 
market, his clients.
Eduardo is able to perform in different social and political settings and is 
used to handling the local media. He has been quoted by local newspapers 
3 Betrayed or caught in serious cases of corruption, fired policemen become madrinas once their 
career within the institution has come to an end. As madrinas officers sell information they still have 
access to through their former colleagues.
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when the federal police raided the San Juan de Dios market, lobbying for the 
retailers’ interests. He has also appeared a couple of times on TV, encouraging 
the reconversión (conversion) of piracy sellers, in meetings and debates with the 
different parties of the music industry.
As a madrina, Eduardo regularly attends the market tenants’ meetings, 
where the sellers and their representantes (agents) gather and discuss prob-
lems. In one of these sessions, Eduardo showed once again his sartorial flair. 
He wore gold rings, bracelets adorned his hands and wrists, his shirt was half 
 unbuttoned showing his hairy chest, a showy mobile hung from his belt, and 
despite being young (he is not even 40 years old) looked somehow older and 
wasted. He introduced himself as the representante of the piratas and fayuqueros 
(the representative of vendors of bootlegged goods and contraband). Dur-
ing the PRI government, these representantes would be labelled as leaders, yet 
in the current political transition, representante is a neutral term. During the 
meeting, Eduardo was to introduce his proposal to the tenants to organise a 
fair in the main patio of the market, where different local producers would 
be given the chance to offer their products directly to the tenants. Eduardo 
pointed out the great opportunity to be able to profit from direct supply, low 
wholesale prices, and the bigger choice of merchandise to sell. He spoke slowly 
and carefully, describing the demands of the new era of globalisation, where 
there are new challenges to be faced. He argued that retailers should not “stay 
in the past”, selling small amounts of handmade sandals and folkloric handi-
crafts. Ramona, who sells leather sandals, was visibly uncomfortable at being 
depicted as part of the past and regarded Eduardo suspiciously.
Eduardo thus has two roles. One he displays as the representante who engages 
in public debates and enjoys media exposure, based on the professional assis-
tance he offers. In the other, more obscure role, Eduardo is a madrina, the cen-
tral link in the network, providing information and security to piracy retailers 
in the San Juan de Dios market, and saves his protégées from police action.
Cuota
In a similar fashion to illegal or mafia-based organisations (Blok 1975;  Heyman 
1999; Paoli 2003; Koonings and Kruijt 2004), monthly payments are collected 
from piracy retailers in order to bribe the federal police. Vendors organised by 
Eduardo pay a cuota (quota), a payment between USD 40-70 per seller, depend-
ing on the merchandise and the size of the stall. The cuota flows upwards 
through the contacts the madrina has, and finally reaches higher levels of the 
police structure, like a federal police commander, with whom a madrina deals. 
Madrinas and police commanders negotiate via subcommanders, because, as 
Sergio, a bootlegged DVD seller and former madrina explains, “the head will 
never show his face”. Once the commander takes his share, the bribe atomises 
and flows down to police officers, as Néstor, a vendor of pirate DVDs explains:
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“Somebody collects the money, and takes it to the federal police, so the 
police turn a blind eye, and they even say ‘that day we are coming, so you 
get ready’. We take away the good discs and leave just waste, bad discs, just 
to, to do as if… so they can say, ‘something’s come up’, but everything is 
full of corruption”.
Although a mordida and a cuota are both in the end bribes, they are  different. 
A mordida is a circumstantial bribe, paid after the negotiation between the two 
involved parties; it is never assumed that the outcome of this negotiation 
will be positive for the retailer, since there is the chance that the officer will 
not accept the bribe. Since it is a circumstantial bribe, the mordida covers one 
action, one time. The cuota, on the other hand, is a more structural bribe, 
a set arrangement that flows upwards in the hierarchy of the organisations 
involved. It ensures safety and provides evidence of the degree to which ille-
gality is embedded in the corporatist state. Andrés, a vendor of pirated DVDs, 
points out:
“[E]verybody who works here pays a cuota. [Then he lowers his voice and 
whispers] Yet it does not mean anything you say, ‘that is not risky’. It is 
not a security. You have to pay to… it is assumed they warn you, but they 
cannot guarantee that they [the police] will not attack you”.
A tool with a double edge, the cuota is a resource that neutralises police 
action, but it is at the same time a means of coercion too. Retailers are put 
under pressure to meet the monthly fee. They know that the cuota provides 
a certain degree of security, and that by not taking part they become an easy 
target for the police. Police action can be routed to affect retailers who do not 
contribute or represent a threat to a given madrina.
Pitazo
While cuota money flows upwards in the piracy structure, reaching entrepre-
neurs and madrinas, the pitazo runs the other way around, top-down. The pitazo 
is the information the cuota-paying seller receives from the madrina on upcom-
ing police action. Once alerted, sellers can protect their merchandise. They 
may leave some merchandise behind in their stalls (old CDs, for instance) just 
to fake the seizure.
At first glance, the cuota and pitazo systems suggest a well-oiled network in 
which federal police, entrepreneurs, madrinas and sellers smoothly cooperate. 
But, in addition to the potential hazards of unaccountable police, sometimes 
the lines of communication are blocked. Hence, pitazos are not always reli-
able. But if a pitazo is passed on, retailers must hide their merchandise. They 
cannot afford a mistake; the money invested in the merchandise has to be 
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 protected. Futher, pitazos may stop circulating when a new police commander is 
appointed in the zone. Informal deals must be renegotiated, and while the new 
commander usually agrees to continue them, higher cuotas may be demanded. 
Then, pitazos will not perform until the commander and the madrina come to a 
new arrangement, and this process can take months. In this uncertain interim 
period, unexpected raids may occur.
Contacts between police officers and piracy entrepreneurs are to a certain 
extent structured, since they do not rely on the favour of one (sub)comman-
dant in particular, but rely instead on agreements that are typically honoured. 
These negotiations are no secret to local authorities. In interviews with high-
ranking government officers, such as the Supervisor of Municipal Markets, 
the Director of Markets of Guadalajara, the Secretary of Government of 
 Guadalajara, the Secretary of Public Security, or the Administrator of the San 
Juan de Dios Market, the authorities acknowledged the efficiency of madrinas 
and pitazos. The Secretary of Public Security for Guadalajara even describes 
the situation as a sort of natural development:
“We have to speak the truth, haven’t we? One of the biggest problems 
is corruption, right? And I have a theory, maybe it sounds a bit odd. I call 
it the fly theory. A fly, when it is tired of crashing against a glass, looks for 
another way out. And many times the policeman is like that: he sees so 
much of, in this case, the retail of pirate things, and sees that he cannot do 
anything, then he tries to take advantage. He says, ‘OK, I know that what 
you do is not legal; that what you do is bad. Then, I do not punish you; I do 
not pick the discs you are selling that are illegal. Give something to me’. And 
there is in many cases corruption in this regard, and it happens; we have to 
acknowledge that it occurs many times”.
In this statement, the police, as an institution, perceive themselves as 
powerless in the face of piracy. It is revealing how the Secretary described 
the role of the police: after all the attempts to enforce the law, a policeman 
“cannot do anything” but try to profit from it, “to take advantage”. Accord-
ing to Pablo Lasso, a local scholar who specialises in informal commerce in 
Guadalajara, this attitude of knowing but not taking action includes a double 
standard:
“The government plays with two different sets of cards. One of dignity 
and honesty; at the upper levels, [corruption] tears them apart. And then, 
those at the lower levels who are appointed to uproot corruption, sadly, 
those are bought off […] but when they are forced from above, we know 
that now and then somebody will be picked and the merchandise seized, but 
they do it randomly and try to not always raid the same retailers”.
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Many note that political discourses on transparency and the fight against 
corruption are little more than lofty rhetoric, since it does not lead to reform 
of the enforcement institutions. Mario, a market seller, put it succinctly: “The 
famous honesty is a bluff”.
“Everybody profits from it because there is a scandalous corruption. 
Nobody knows anything, but everything is under control. And if they [the 
police] come in the morning, by noon they [retailers] have discs to sell 
again.”
DEBATE: DOES CORRUPTION EXPAND STATE POWER?
The ambivalence of the federal police in anti-piracy programs helps to study 
the rise of bootleg in Mexico. The piracy index (percentage of pirated material 
of the total available) was estimated at 63% in 2000 and increased to 80% in 
2008. For the same period, retail of legal CDs plummeted 60% which resulted 
in the massive closing of established shops for recorded music (Aguiar 2010). 
In the San Juan de Dios market the amount of bootleg sellers has not visibly 
decreased, it is likely the opposite. Anti-piracy measures show little success, if 
any. Therefore, a closer analysis is here necessary to assess the impact of cor-
ruption in policing practices, and the benefits from the ambiguous interaction 
between state and illegal actors.
From a normative point of view, corruption erodes the rule of law and under-
mines the authority of state actors (Tulchin and Ruthenburg 2006). Yet, from 
an integrative perspective, corruption generates supplementary mechanisms 
for state expansion, which include parallel taxing or political dominance. The 
last is the case of gunmen and death squads in Brazil and Guatemala that 
extend the presence and power of the state through illegal, violent actors (Van 
Reenen 2004). In her study of banditry, unregulated commerce and corrup-
tion in the Chad Basin, Roitman describes the exchange of financial resources 
between officers and smugglers to conclude the following:
“[corruption is constitutive of the] ‘normal order,’ as licit activities inso-
far as they are admissible and have in some ways come to represent certain 
truths about the economic, or about ways of acting effectively in the econo-
mic realm […] maintaining states of illegality is a mode for establishing and 
authenticating the exercise of power over economic relations and forms of 
wealth” (Roitman 2006: 264).
Clearly, the state here is not a super-structure above social relations and 
regulating all exchanges with basis on a regime of legitimacy. State actors are, 
thus, not the bureaucrats Weber identified: the embodiment of the  professional 
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competences and principles defined by the state. In fact, the political author-
ity and the regime of legitimacy are fuzzy constructs. Corruption and illegality, 
as Gupta points out, are contested:
“When considering modern bureaucracies, thus, even when an unambi-
guous legal mechanism exists to determine corruption, if there is no wides-
pread social agreement about which scale is to be used to judge ‘correct’ 
ethical behavior, the social judgment of corruption can often be contentious 
and fractured” (Gupta 2005: 8).
Implicitly, normative and integrative approaches suppose that the arrange-
ments between state and illegal actors are reliable. Corruption generates some 
kind of trust: the exchange of values provides illegal actors with certainty. 
The outcome of this process can be either the constitution or erosion of state 
power. In both the disintegration and the expansion of the state underlies the 
assumption that these arrangements do establish fixed protocols on base of 
which these two sets of actors negotiate, coexist or cooperate.
Piracy sellers meet cuotas and take risks because they perceive their under-
taking (retail of an illegal product) as a social right, that is, a licit illegality; 
interestingly, they do not necessarily perceive these mechanisms as pervert 
state presence or coercion.
Yet, the interaction between police officers and piracy retailers is, as observed 
in the San Juan de Dios market, ambiguous and uncertain. Sellers must pay 
monthly fees, coutas which constitute a mechanism of coercion; in turn, retail-
ers are allowed to operate and receive critical information. The information 
and protection provided by madrinas to sellers in the marketplace can however 
never guarantee immunity. Shifty and unreliable police may act without notice 
or seize the merchandise of a cuota-paying vendor. In this context, corruption 
does not engender reliable mechanisms, it entails an extent of uncertainty and 
risk. This becomes tangible in falsas alarmas, in unexpected police action, or 
when a madrina directs police action against a rival seller. All in all, the corrup-
tion system around the sale of bootleg is not stable.
Hence, do the mechanisms observable in mordidas, cuotas, madrinas and pita-
zos in the retail of bootleg at the San Juan de Dios market expand the presence 
of the state? Yes, but they do not account for (parallel) state power. Rather, 
these are resources to handle with remote state presence. In order to establish 
this, the figure of the madrina, the middleman joining state and illegal actors, is 
essential. Madrinas mediate contact between police officers and bootleg retail-
ers; they collect financial resources and socialise critical police information. 
Madrinas generate a buffer where illegality can exist by administrating, direct-
ing or neutralising police action. Hence, the madrina does not substitute or 
erode the state, he indeed uses it to regulate networks of supply and retail.
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Corruption engenders a buffer through which madrinas steer remote state 
presence: the police appears and disappears in the marketplace to seize (or 
not) bootlegged material, selectively enforcing the rule of law.
Police presence is however required, since the national state is account-
able for commercial agreements and international pressure. Corporate lobbies 
efficiently mobilise to set legal mechanisms in action demanding protection 
of their commercial interests. Encroached on its realm of power, the national 
state is urged to take action against infringements on intellectual property 
rights. As a result, the Mexican state is trapped into two sets of interests. 
From above, there is the rule of law emerging from global neoliberalism and 
corporate power. From below, piracy entrepreneurs, sellers and madrinas form 
another economic class holding a certain extent of power. The “war on piracy” 
seeks not to reduce the sale of bootlegged merchandise, but to provide evi-
dence on Mexico’s commitment to copyright enforcement.
Police action against retail of pirated CDs and DVDs in Mexico does not 
enforce the rule of law, it gives evidence of remote state presence embedded in 
elusive networks of loyalties and exchanges of values. This conforms the black 
spot in the anti-piracy programme of the Mexican federal government.
WRAPPING UP
The ethnography on the political economy of corruption presented in this 
article described mordidas, cuotas, madrinas and pitazos. These are mechanisms 
visible in the retail of pirated CDs and DVDs in Mexican marketplaces. They 
provide evidence on the ambivalent relation between state and illegal actors. 
As discussed, police and sellers do not form two separate sets of actors, they 
are instead entrenched in a net of ambiguous interests. The arrangements and 
exchanges between them are however unstable. Neither erosion nor expan-
sion, the impact of illegality and corruption on the state is unclear. Police 
action against sell of piracy takes place in a vague set of loyalties, it constitutes 
remote state presence. State actors profit from and tolerate illegality, but they 
are shifty, engendering much unpredictability and risk.
Anti-piracy programmes overlook the net of loyalties among piracy ven-
dors, federal police, and municipal agents. As a result, security polices fail at 
addressing the multidirectional exchanges of values between these actors. 
In the long run, the success of policies for the control of illegality will depend 
on the capacity to tackle the context in which state and illegal actors are 
embedded.
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A relação ambígua entre o Estado e os atores ilegais: o mercado da pirataria no México  José 
Carlos G. Aguiar  Department of Latin American Studies (TLCA), University of Leiden, Países 
 Baixos  j.c.g.aguiar@hum.leidenuniv.nl
Quando surgiram os governos democráticos na América Latina, a perspetiva neoliberal da lei e da 
ordem constituiu-se como o modelo de segurança dominante na região. Esta abordagem baseia-se na 
oposição entre o Estado e os agentes da ilegalidade, como se fossem dois conjuntos de atores distintos. 
Influenciado por este modelo, o presidente mexicano Vicente Fox lançou um programa alargado contra 
a pirataria, pretendendo erradicar a venda da contrafação. A partir de material etnográfico recolhido 
no mercado de San Juan de Dios, em Guadalajara, examino as interações entre vendedores de merca-
doria pirata e agentes da polícia. Argumento que os programas para a aplicação da lei não afetaram a 
economia política da corrupção e que ignoram a rede de lealdades ambíguas que envolvem o Estado e 
os atores ilegais. A antropologia do Estado oferece os princípios para uma crítica sobre as políticas de 
segurança neoliberais.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: pirataria, ilegalidade, polícia, México.
